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1.  World Financial Markets Recently
1.1 Economics is a quantitative science in two di-
mensions: money and time. Thus, in analysing world 
problems pure economic analysis has to leave out 
everything that does not depend on money and time. 
Economic analysis is therefore always only partial 
analysis.
When international capital movements are comple-
tely free – and that has been the quasi-constitutional 
case for EU-Europe since only 1990 and for the USA, 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand since about the 
same time or even earlier – international financial 
markets behave nearly rationally, i.e. they are almost 
exclusively determined by the uses of money over 
time.
The characteristic properties of free financial ca-
pital markets were already described by Th. Mun, 
England's Treasure By Forraign Trade, written with 
the intent of expressing the international limitati-
on of the power of King Charles I and published by 
Mun's son in 1664 for the returned king Charles II. 
The king (eventually: the government) has no pow-
er either of setting the exchange rate of the domestic 
currency to foreign currencies or of setting the inte-
rest rate (thought to be internationally determined). 
Thus, with free capital movements, already then assu-
med as a matter of course, the king (the government) 
has no influence over the two critical prices: the ex-
change rate and the interest rate. Governed by those 
prices the quantity of foreign exchange drifts back 
and forth in the current and the capital accounts, de-
termining the accumulation of "England's Treasure" 
via exports and imports on the one hand and capital 
movements on the other.
"Kings" in the 17th and 18th centuries and govern-
ments and/or large international banks in the 21st 
century did not and do not at all like the idea of being 
nearly powerless on financial markets. They are near-
ly powerless because, of course, they are themselves 
actors on free international markets, but their funds 
are usually quite limited relative to the total funds 
moveable on free international capital markets. At 
best, they can exercise some influence if and when 
private actors on financial markets are more or less 
in quantitative equilibrium and especially if they are 
rather uncertain how interest rates and exchange ra-
tes are going to change. Likewise, governments and 
large international bankers can exercise some influ-
ence at best in the short run only, and, in so-called 
"crises", not even then. Long-term attempts (as made 
repeatedly) to falsify interest rates and/or exchange 
rates in the interest of particular groups tend to re-
sult in large international bankruptcies. The attempts 
of the French kings during the 18th century ended 
with the bankruptcy at the beginning of the 1790s in 
the French Revolution, and the attempt in particular 
of Alan Greenspan in the 2000s ended in the huge 
American banking and government bankruptcy of 
2007–2009.
1.2 Not untypically, France's bankruptcy in the revo-
lutionary early 1790s was due to the fact that France 
had had to pay, the whole century long, twice the 
interest rate of its main competitor Great Britain, 
so that by the late 1780s her national debt cost her 
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about 75% annually of all government revenue.1 (The 
French people, not understanding finance, attributed 
the bankruptcy to the expenses of the Court – which 
were actually quite small). In addition, France had 
lost each of her 18th century naval wars, which were 
extremely costly.2 
The bankruptcy of the 1790s brought the expropriati-
on of the real estate of the French church and that of 
large parts of the aristocracy and also hyperinflation 
of the currency. The great US-American bankruptcy 
of 2007–2008 actually was not much different from 
the French one 215 years earlier: It was due to the 
government initiative of first the Clinton administ-
ration (1993–2001), continued by the G.W.Bush ad-
ministration (2001–2009), to increase via easy credit 
the percentage of private home ownership, eventu-
ally amounting to a full 100% of credit for the already 
bloated purchasing prices for newly built homes. As 
housing prices had increased and sales fees also were 
large (the sales agents being the only ones to profit), 
houses were eventually sold at about double their ac-
tual value so that a crash of extended house credit 
became inevitable. The crash occurred during the 
summer of 2007 up to the first quarter of 2009 – one 
half of it was due to irretrievable mortgage credits 
and the other half to other bank credits. But actually 
those private credits were at base governmental or 
fiscal credits and the failed credits were in the end 
largely taken over by government agencies, Fanny 
Mae and Freddy Mac, and by the federal budget: 
US public indebtedness doubled from 2008 to 2012 
to about 110% of GDP [gross domestic product]. 
Government financial involvement was largely due 
to the decisions and activities of one pivotal figure, 
Alan Greenspan, governor of the Federal Reserve 
from 1987 to 2006. Explicitly stating that the huge 
US current account deficit of up to 8% of GDP, due 
to a government budget deficit of up to 6.5% of GDP, 
was the least of his sorrows, Greenspan kept stimu-
lating the economy during the Bush administration. 
Adroitly, he retired prematurely at the end of January 
2006, excusing himself with his age of 80, but actu-
ally one and a half years before the inevitable crash. 
1 See Th.J. Sargent, F.R. Velde, "Macroeconomic Features of 
the French Revolution", Journal of Political Economy 103/3 
(1995), pp. 474–518.
2 She lost about 60 battle ships in battle and about 100 alto-
gether, each of them costing some 30.000 pounds or about 
ten times as much as the typical large textile factory employ-
ing 300 people, i.e. altogether the capital of a thousand 
factories. 
This came in the summer of 2007, climaxing with the 
bankruptcy of the largest financial firm in the USA, 
Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008. 
1.3 International financial markets are ruled by their 
actors' expectations about money and time. With 
very few exceptions, US-American theory considers 
financial markets as having a uniform demand for 
one central asset, US dollars on the internal US fi-
nancial market, which is passively financed by for-
eign actors via the US current account. Furthermore, 
if there are shifts in demand, rational expectations 
are thought to rule. This means that if there is only 
one, unique rationality the world consists of only 
one actor, shifting expectations immediately and 
uniquely.
This very primitive one-actor-one-asset-model – 
who is this actor by the way: is it, as sometimes assu-
med, the US government or the uniformly acting US 
banks? – also assumes one single time dimension, i.e. 
"now". Actually, under present conditions, and since 
the years 2000 or 2005, this primitive model has not 
been such a bad simplification: At present the US 
current account deficit of 425 billion Euros is pas-
sively financed (notionally) to one half by Germany 
(237.6 billion) and one half by China (224.8 billion) 
– the largest, though much smaller other current ac-
count deficits above 50 billion dollars being those of 
India (93.4 billion), Great Britain (91.5), Brazil (70.0), 
Canada (62.3), France (61.3), and Australia (51.1), all 
these summed up still smaller than that of the USA. 
This primitive model is at present a good simplifica-
tion and may continue to be so as long as there are no 
large shifts in demand on the international financial 
markets (supply being even more stable). Demand 
shifts take long to be realised by the different actors 
and the international financial market is then for 
long periods out of long-run equilibrium and pro-
gressively adjusting. This was so in 2008 and 2009. 
While the real rate of return on "safe" financial mar-
kets, i.e. financial markets of reliably paying govern-
ments, as historically for Britain since the 1730s, 
used to be 3 to 3.5%, nowadays – with the oversup-
ply of funds over demand – the safe rate has now 
reached 1% on good private funds, 1.5% on 10-year 
government bonds and 2.5% (end-June 2013) on US 
government bonds. The much higher rates of returns 
for investment with private debtors, or the 4.14% that 
Italy has to pay, and the 4.46% that Spain has to pay 
on 10-year government bonds, are due to the risk of 
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non-repayment. Thus the degree of risk experienced 
is the central explanatory variable: differences of re-
turn.
While the Nobel Laureate Paul Krugman thought 
the standard international trade model of explai-
ning trade by different capital costs (interest rates) 
and labour costs is now obsolete because with free 
international capital markets interest rates would 
all equalize worldwide, the Nobel Laureate Robert 
E. Lucas Jr. argued that this is not so: The different 
degrees of riskiness, both of private investments – less 
developed economies produce many raw materials 
with cyclically highly variable demand over time and 
also labour there is much less disciplined and reliable 
– and in particular also the riskiness due to the public 
dominance over private supply, lead to much higher 
rates of interest on the financial markets of less de-
veloped economies. He argued this in his important 
article "Why doesn't Capital Flow from Rich to Poor 
Countries?"3
1.4 Thus, financial markets are dominated by expec-
tations about the value of money and expectations 
about time and consequently by the changes in such 
expectations. For the last quarter century these ex-
pectations about reasonably safe returns have to be 
long-run ones, typically, at least over five to ten years 
and even longer periods, being represented by the re-
turns on 10-year government bonds of "safe" debtors. 
Expectations of each individual will typically be for a 
mean price, i.e. interest development with a variance 
around that mean. This subjective probability distri-
bution will be either one of risk in its precise sense, i.e. 
expectations covering all expected states of the world 
together with the probabilities of the realisation of 
each one of these states; or much more likely one of 
uncertainty where the possible states of the world 
and their probabilities are not fully known. While 
there thus is a marked variance of expectations for 
each actor, there is also an important variance bet-
ween actors. Alan Greenspan has stated that even the 
possibly best-informed financial actor, the US Fede-
3 American Economic Review, PP, 80 (1990), pp. 92–96. In fact, 
his argument is slightly different: He explains differences 
in returns in developed and underdeveloped countries 
by differences in human capital and an external economy: 
production which he thinks is due to monopoly power in 
the investing "West" and to effects of public policy, while I 
replace by now implausible monopoly power by high private 
production risks, thus altogether the riskiness of investment, 
for short.
ral Reserve, is even for the short-period forecast of 
one half year constantly hovering between assump-
tions of risk and uncertainty.4 During and after the 
Great Crash of 2007-2009 the degree of uncertainty 
for actors has much increased and actually has staid 
high since then, in spite of the constant overoptimis-
tic forecasts of US banks. Before 2008 US banks often 
lent up to 40 or even up to 80 times the expected fu-
ture asset value, which assumed both the value of the 
asset, on which the loan was given, could be forecast 
precisely – actually it was thought that the asset value 
of securities could only rise over time – and also that 
their variability would be extremely small. Actually, 
during the last phase of the boom, 2005–2007, many 
US banks had lent out so-called "subprime" mortga-
ges on private homes to debtors who did not contri-
bute anything at all to the purchase price, the loan 
being 110% of the then house value – i.e. it was assu-
med that house prices would rise rapidly still further, 
an increase that never came. House prices then fell 
to two thirds of the assumed value at the time of sale, 
implying that banks lost about 40% of their loan va-
lue, and that only if the bank was willing to become 
immobilized on the houses that had reverted to it, 
not selling them off rapidly once more. Since 2008 
banks have been trying constantly to get people to 
invest in international assets, but since 2008 those 
have actually had low and highly variable, i.e. risky, 
returns. 
I am quite proud to have been the only economist in 
the German language area to have correctly forecast, 
already in 2002, that the best return over the entire 
period 2000–2012 could be achieved by "investing" 
in a medium-term savings account, denominated 
in one's domestic currency. Other investments may 
have had a slightly higher average rate of return, but 
more than the difference would have to be spent 
on the fees charged by the bank selling those assets. 
Thus, such riskier investments would only be good 
for the bank selling the asset (because of the bank fee 
charged on entering the investment), but not at all 
for the final investor. Actually, in the last fifteen years 
European banks had stimulated many investments 
that would be highly unprofitable for the average 
investor, but highly profitable for the banks: They 
sold investment opportunities in financial assets for 
very high fees, never clearly publicized, leaving the 
4 Alan Greenspan, "Risk and Uncertainty in Monetary Policy", 
American Economic Review 94/2 (2004), pp. 33–40, here pp. 
36f.
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asset price risk and/or the rate of return risk with the 
private investor. The potential investor was advised 
to invest, against his actual risk preferences, in the 
riskiest investment opportunities, i.e. in long-term 
assets denominated in foreign currencies, highly 
variable in their relative prices. Why? because those 
meant the highest fees for the bank.
1.5 Financial markets are dominated by more or less 
rational investment decisions as to money, the in-
vestment being by now international and determined 
by expectations of different investors reacting at dif-
ferent speeds to differently seen expected asset prices. 
To a large extent, financial markets are at present do-
minated by the US market, which, influenced by the 
American banks, appears to be still too optimistic in 
expectations about the rates of return on financial 
markets. The peak of US optimism, however, and 
the low point of returns seems to have been reached 
around April 2013, returns in the USA since then ha-
ving by now (i.e. end of June, 2013) already markedly 
increased (from 1.7 to 2.3% for 10-year government 
bonds). But world finance is still dominated by a US 
current account deficit of 425–475 billion Euro (figu-
res around April 2013), notionally financed in more 
ore less equal parts by Germany and by China. Ba-
sically, not much has changed over the last 30 years, 
apart from the fact that 20 or 30 years ago the US 
deficit had been financed in more or less equal parts 
by Germany and by Japan.
What is not sufficiently realised, particularly in the 
USA, is that the long-run economic growth perspec-
tive for GDP for developed nations is now a growth 
rate of only about 1% per capita a year; and for ma-
terial production, i.e. excluding services, of 0%, me-
aning that at best it will be stationary. The high point 
of world material production was reached around 
2005. Especially world food prices had then reached 
their low point and have risen since then, with ups 
and downs, and the same is true of energy prices. 
The USA, which at present have an (overestimated) 
boom in new types of domestic energy production, 
underestimate the increasing scarcity of food and 
raw materials – a fact that every Austrian housewife 
and every motor car driver will confirm from their 
price experiences. The USA, too, will have to learn 
that those price increases will continue in the long 
run. They are due to the fact that oil and gas reser-
ves will be more and more exhausted, all substitutes 
being more costly, and to the fact that climate change 
will change and possibly reduce agricultural are-
as (because of both aridity and severe flooding and 
because some new forms of energy production will 
require large areas of land). 
Of course, it is not only the efficiency of financial 
markets that determines the costs of a developed eco-
nomy. The quality of "services" in general is of con-
siderable importance. But in terms of an economy's 
human capital, it is above all the efficiency of the 
health and the education sectors that count. In the 
USA health costs gobble up about one sixth of natio-
nal income, while in Austria they are not much high-
er than 10%. As US federal health expenditure leaves 
out a large part of potential beneficiaries, US health 
costs are by efficiency units twice as high as Austrian 
ones. This is due to the fact that US health services 
are provided much more for the profit or income of 
health providers while Austrian public health servi-
ces still rely somewhat more on the spirit of altruism 
and idealism of the caring personnel. As to educa-
tion, two examples must suffice: In Austria education 
is strongly income oriented and above all dominated 
by the teachers union, in Finland it is guided by a 
high ethic: only the best students are allowed to be-
come the teachers of the next generation. 
1.6 When we look at the sources of national income 
and product over the last 20 years within EU-Europe 
on the one hand and the USA, Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand on the other, we have first to consider 
the seven years from 1993 to 1999 with peak annu-
al growth rates of five to even seven per cent. Tho-
se high growth rates were largely misunderstood in 
the USA, and particularly by their banking sector, as 
New Age normalcy instead of as the peak of a cyclical 
boom. In the USA the boom was also misunderstood 
as one of the whole economy, while it actually was a 
boom of the banking and financial sector only.
The US industrial sector (the sector of material pro-
duction) was actually coming more and more under 
destructive competition from rising East Asian and 
South Asian producers. In the USA, Canada, Austra-
lia and New Zealand and in EU-Europe, particularly 
in Germany, Finland, the Netherlands, and Austria 
the years 1995–1999 have to be seen as the peak of 
the fifth Kondratieff boom of waves of innovations 
since about 1790. These Kondratieff waves last al-
together about 40 years each and comprise in their 
peaks the bunchings of many different innovations, 
followed by periods when innovations of then alrea-
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dy "old" techniques have been largely exhausted, i.e. 
by periods of near-stagnation.
The period 1995–1999 was unusual,5 however, in the 
sense that there were then not several big innova-
tions, but only one, that of the computer hardware 
together with its new applications, personal compu-
ter software. Furthermore, this boom was unusual 
in as much as computer innovations proved to be 
strongly capital saving instead of capital using; fur-
thermore, computer innovations spread very rapid-
ly because they were so cheap. In contrast, e.g., the 
great innovation around the middle of the 19th centu-
ry, the introduction and the spread of steam railways, 
which were very costly to build – initially with slow 
effects, too – required very much new capital.
Computers on the other hand could be cheaply built 
and rapidly installed, so that the branch as a whole 
gained relatively little, all the advantages rapidly fal-
ling to its customers, the computer users. After the 
boom the most publicized and thus significant early 
failure of a computer-using firm in the USA was that 
of Enron in 2002, but there was a large number of 
early failures besides. Even the paradigmatic "new" 
firm, Microsoft, and its paradigmatic owner, Bill Ga-
tes, instead of further increasing their property value, 
lost one half of it between 2000 and 2012 and thus 
ended with one quarter of the value normally to be 
expected from further average growth.
Thus the great boom of 1995–1999 was immediate-
ly followed by a period of very much lower realised 
growth rates, difficult, however, to estimate because 
not only the average social product growth rate went 
down substantially but also the variance of growth 
increased markedly.
This decline was particularly marked in the USA, but 
was generally denied to be happening. The common 
denial of a crisis led to the largest number of bank-
ruptcies ever or at least to the largest bank crash (in a 
wider sense) since more than a century. This general 
denial of facts has a parallel in the talking down of 
the increasing number  and  intensity  of environmen- 
tal catastrophes. They do not enter national income 
accounts and therefore continue to be considered as 
exceptional, while actually becoming ever more fre-
quent. 
5 In a speech on December 5, 1996, Greenspan held that "ir-
rational exuberance has unduly escalated asset values". See 
the same, The Age of Turbulence, London 2007, p. 177.
1.7 Quite generally, serious financial difficulties fol-
lowed from 2000 onwards. The crucial question has 
been and is: Should government help firms, parti-
cularly those that are making the relatively largest 
losses (although often those were the very ones that 
had made the biggest gains earlier on); or shouldn't 
government rather help the general public, i.e. in de-
mocracies the average voter, especially in case of seri-
ous financial losses for the entire economy?
This crucial question is far from having been answe-
red unequivocally, but continues to be the subject of 
heated debates, nationally and internationally. The 
answer that individual economies will find for this 
question will determine to a large extent how much 
they will have to spend on matters other than saving 
their banks, on important matters like research, de-
velopment and innovations with a view to their fu-
ture – a future of dwindling resources as to energy 
and foodstuffs.
Jeff Madrick6 has stressed that in the USA over the 
last years mathematicians have been in high demand 
by firms. They receive about three times higher sa-
laries than general managers or economists. Mathe-
maticians will tend to analyse highly complicated 
economic constellations, but – a weighty "but" – will 
restrict themselves to basically stationary systems.7 
They will therefore tend to underestimate the degree 
of change, in the USA as well as in Europe, of a global 
economy with increasing environmental costs, with 
climate change and with markedly increasing energy 
costs, due to the exhaustion of global oil resources. 
Typically, Americans therefore underestimate long- 
run energy price changes in contrast to Europeans, 
although this is also partly due to the fact that the 
USA are desperately trying to get more "self-sup-
porting" in energy – eager to develop shale oil and 
tar-sands.
Lord Stern8 in Britain estimates that energy costs 
will increase by 1% a year. This is an underestima-
tion, however, since Stern assumes that homogene-
ous economic decision takers will always take the 
6  Jeff Madrick,  Age of Greed, New York 2011.
7 That economies behave as basically stationary systems is the 
fundamental vision of Milton Friedman. See the same, "The 
Methodology of Positive Economics" in: Essays in Positive 
Economics, Chicago 1953.
8 Nicholas Stern, „The Economics of Climate Change", Ameri-
can Economic Review, PP 98/2 (2008), pp. 1–37.
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best decision, i.e. the least-cost development decis-
ion. In reality, though, important established energy 
producers will tend to impede the best, i.e. least-
cost development for the economy as a whole. Thus, 
Americans generally tend to overestimate the possi-
ble growth rate of the economy, particularly at the 
beginning of each year, being regularly disappointed 
around April, while Europe tends to assume much 
lower growth. This is only to a small part due to its 
particular economic inefficiency, viz. high youth 
unemployment, especially in Southern Europe and 
France, but much rather to the relative rise of the top 
wages of 20% or 30% of qualified workers – relative 
to Germany and Austria – in the first years after the 
introduction of the Euro. 
A.B. Atkinson9 has also shown that recently the US 
income distribution has become much more uneven 
– far more than in other developed economies. Most 
of all, US top wages have gone up. This is largely so 
because on the one hand US top commercial salaries 
have increased so much more than elsewhere, and 
also because of the (already touched upon) fact that 
the salaries in the financial sectors, most of all those 
of mathematicians, have far outrun the correspon-
ding payments in other countries.
1.8 As the world as a whole is a closed economy, re-
alised world savings have to equal realised world in-
vestments. But at least since 2000, i.e. by now in its 
14th year, intended world savings by far exceed rea-
lised savings, and also intended worlds investments. 
Intended savings have thus to be reduced to the vo-
lume of realisable savings. And since for more than 
30 years now the USA have been the ones to reduce 
realised world savings by consuming – instead of 
investing – them: The current account deficit of the 
USA is huge, at present being still 425 trillion Euro 
(it had been around 800 trillion in 2005–2007); and 
notionally China and Germany each finance about 
one half of this excessive consumption, as mentioned 
above.
Around 2000, China started to try to invest about 5% 
to 10% of its huge savings (of about 50% of GDP) in 
foreign – most of it as short-term investment in the 
USA. By now, this Chinese inflow there is more like 
four to 5% of Chinese GDP: In spite of all attempts 
9 Anthony B. Atkinson, Th.Pickety, E.Saez, „Top Incomes in 
the Long Run of History", Journal of Economic Literature 
49/1 (2011), pp.3–71.
to invest, particularly in Africa, China has not been 
able to stop placing large amounts of its savings in 
the USA, which are then consumed in the US. The 
USA are still able to run a – by now somewhat redu-
ced – current account deficit of –4.5%, which apart 
from present-day Japan (–8.7% of GDP), Britain 
(–7%) and Spain (per–7%) is relatively the largest, 
and of course, absolutely the by far largest one in the 
developed world.
Thus, since the year 2000 the world has been suffe-
ring – suffering is the mot juste – from an excess of 
intended savings which, above all, the USA are sim-
ply gobbling up by their huge current account deficit. 
It took the general public long to realise that there 
is such an excess of world savings and that therefo-
re interest rates had to fall correspondingly. It was 
mainly US-American banks, followed by European 
banks that clouded this issue. It is true that interest 
rates for credits to the public for some of the credits 
between banks fell markedly. But average interest 
rates of credit to non-bank private individuals could 
be kept up and also interest rates of credits to some 
countries like Greece. In general, however, well-es-
tablished private firms did not need any investment 
credits because they had stocked up on funds – in 
fact more than necessarily stocked up relative to the 
lower growth rates after 2000. So it was rather the 
more dubious firms that had to pay higher interest 
rates for investment credits, which were actually 
higher due to risk premiums. And above all, it was 
housing construction credits that were thought by 
many banks – especially in the USA and Spain – to 
offer good investment opportunities, although actu-
ally they only created large capital losses of perhaps 
some 40% from 2007 onwards.
Only since 2011 it has been generally realised, at least 
by European banks, that funds were more than amp-
le; so then interest rates fell by about 1%. At present in 
Austria good medium term bank credit pays around 
1.6%, while medium-term savings accounts pay 7/8 
of 1%, leaving only a tiny margin to the banks.
In the USA interest rates had probably reached a se-
cular low around April 2013, starting to rise after that 
when it became likely that the Federal Reserve would 
try to stop its unlimited bank funding (at short term 
interest rates of only 0.2%). Safe 10-year government 
bonds interest rates, which had touched a mere 1.5%, 
have by now, mid 2013 (The Economist June 29th), 
reached 2.54%. This is, however, still 1% below the 
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long-time normal non-inflationary rate of about 
3.5% which Britain has had since the 1730s. (The 
1.6% measured consumer price increase in the USA 
at present corresponds to 0% true domestic inflation, 
as the consumer price index, for well-known reasons, 
overestimates actual inflation by at least 1 percentage 
point, to which has to be added at present that some 
further measured inflation is due to imported price 
rises of foodstuffs and of energy which should be 
deducted for the calculation of domestically caused 
inflation.)
In estimating an increase in real product and in 
spending power a further important point has to be 
remembered: The USA, which always tend to look 
at their locally created national income, and not at 
the United Nations standard measures, constantly 
overestimate their current earning and consuming 
power: At present (see The Economist, June 29, p. 84), 
the annual increase in US GDP is estimated at 1.8%; 
but the increase in their foreign debt, i.e. the current 
account deficit, is estimated at –2.8%, so that net 
US increase in wealth is actually minus (!) 1%. For 
Austria, on the other hand, the estimated increase in 
GDP is only 0.6%. But, on the other hand Austria is 
accumulating foreign assets, as its current account 
surplus is estimated at 2.1%. Together these two figu-
res would amount to a 2.7% increase in yearly gross 
income. (Whether the German increase with a 6.2% 
measured current account surplus is any larger may 
be doubted, because much of the German current ac-
count surplus is, in fact, a transfer at 0% interest. This 
has to be interpreted as a gift to other countries; and 
gifts, being one-sided, do not enter national income 
calculations, which are only the sum of two-sided 
transactions.) 
Considering the 2000s as a whole, we have to re-
member that Alan Greenspan – of all people – esti-
mated that the capital losses of the Great Crash of 
2007–2009 amounted for the entire world to 40 tril-
lion dollar or about 60% of average annual world in-
come; and for the USA to 17 trillion or about 120% 
of a year's GDP.  Subtracting that from the measured 
growth rate of domestic income and product we find 
a strong decline in income in the USA over the whole 
first decade of the 21st century. We have to recognize 
that the initial estimate of the fall in domestic pro-
duct a little later proved to have been somewhat ove-
restimated, but, on the other hand we have to add on 
the large environmental damages in the USA during 
that decade – which are not included in the national 
accounts –, then the true average of the US economic 
growth rate for the 2000s was at best zero and more 
probably slightly negative.
The low point of energy prices and also of relative 
food prices was probably reached around 2005. Since 
then, both food and energy prices have gone up mar-
kedly. But that is not a once and for all occurrence, 
but much rather the beginning of a trend likely to 
continue, even if the USA are once more in denial be-
cause of the – probably highly overestimated – possi-
bilities of finding shale oil or gas and using tar-sands.
Altogether peak production of natural oil has proba-
bly already been passed; and alternatives to oil will 
be more expensive. And the same is true of the ave-
rage cost of food supply. In Austria, prices for farm 
products have already somewhat increased over the 
past years. And the increase in forestry or growing 
of "bio-mass" for the purpose of creating additional 
sources of energy is a questionable alternative for the 
use of land for growing foodstuffs. Climate change 
may cause more drought and also floods, in turn re-
ducing food production.
Thus for the next decade and for the average of the 
developed world an average growth rate of about 
0.5% a year seems likely at best. (Remember that for 
the 1990s and the 2000s Japan had an average growth 
rate of only 0.25%.) The growth rate of Austria might 
be somewhat higher at perhaps 1% of GDP10 if   in-
novative small and medium firms should succeed in 
finding new sources of energy (a hope recently ex-
pressed by the President of the Austrian Trade Uni-
ons, Erich Foglar11). In the longer run, however, we 
are likely to witness slightly negative average growth 
rates, so that, e.g. for Austria at least material social 
product (i.e. product without services) for the year 
2050 would be about the same as at present. And as 
population is unlikely to increase noticeably, also so-
cial product per capita is likely to be about the same 
as in 2010. Further growth is likely to become ever 
10 A comprehensive and critical study of Austria (as compared 
with other EU-countries) has just been presented by Bernd 
Marin, Welfare in an Idle Society? – Reinventing Retirement, 
Work, Wealth, Health, and Welfare, Farnham – Burlington 
2013. As to a general historical survey of financial crises see 
Carmen M. Reinhart, Kenneth S. Rogoff, This Time is Differ-
ent – Eight Centuries of Finacial Folly, Princeton, NJ, 2009.
11 Erich Foglar, "Förderung der Arbeitskraft Österreichs in 
Gegenwart und Zukunft", Public Lecture at the Austrian 
Academy of Sciences, December 19, 2012.
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more costly and therefore low or negative for envi-
ronmental reasons.
2. Long-Term Environmental Problems, 
Climate Change and Increasing Scarcity  
of Natural Resources
2.1 The economies that were gained by the wave of 
computer innovations have been rather exhausted by 
now. What may be the next possibilities for large in-
novatory advances? Of course, the main innovations 
of the next, the sixth Kondratieff, which may be ex-
pected to peak around 2040 or even 2050, cannot be 
made out as yet, 30 years in advance. But two types of 
innovation can already be discerned.
On the one hand, there is innovation in health econo-
mics. Austria, and especially the Austrian Academy 
of Sciences, is at the fore here: The three large insti-
tutes of the Academy IMBA, CEMM, and CMI are 
leaders, costing altogether somewhat over 50 milli-
on Euro a year – to which one has to add derivative 
products of their research. The eventual "product" of 
health economics does not, however, fully increase 
calculated GDP as such: An increase in the life span 
of human beings, e.g., does not enter national pro-
duct calculations.
Long-term environmental improvements or the re-
tarding of climate change and finding cheaper substi-
tutes for the natural resources that get scarcer all the 
time, do constitute typical economic innovations. As 
every single such innovation is likely to be relatively 
small, Austria is well suited to find some of them: On 
the one hand, we have the small and medium firms 
that are likely to produce such innovations in highly 
specialized fields. (In his lecture at the Academy Fo-
glar gave three examples of such firms with very high 
R&D investments.) Some of those firms  (all told pro-
bably 184) are, in fact, world monopolists, of which 
Austria has a relatively large share. On the other hand, 
Austria does not have the big firms in old standard 
production lines, which typically tend to impede in-
novations, because they only see harmful competiti-
on there. It is exactly the innovative type of small and 
medium firms that has made for a shift of industry 
away from the traditional core in Northwest Europe 
to south of the Main, i.e. to Bavaria, Austria and the 
Neckar valley of Baden-Württemberg.
At least up to 2008 Austria was rather hesitant to turn 
toward long-term environmental change and deve-
lopment of new resources. Such developments typi-
cally take time and require initial long-term invest-
ments, i.e. investments that do not bring in returns 
for many years to come. So financial capital was not 
at all forthcoming. On the other hand, Austria has 
had a comparatively (both in EU comparison and 
world comparison) low rate of unemployment, espe-
cially of youth unemployment; this means that a lot 
of young people must have been in training. In other 
words: Comparatively little human capital has been 
wasted and at least part of it was/is being improved. 
This may be a reason for hope that more of the exis-
ting firms develop an interest in innovation and that 
some new firms as well turn to environment-friendly 
and resource-saving production lines.
2.2 Topics relating to long-term environmental pro-
blems that should be dealt with by natural scientists 
are typically highly specialised. Therefore one has to 
find scientists willing to take up new topics in addi-
tion to their current specialization and, even more 
important, to get young scientists to turn to such in-
novative topics.
Fields in which pertinent studies should be underta-
ken were suggested on June 10, 2013 at a meeting of 
KIOES. They were
•	 organismic botany and  
organismic terrestrial zoology
•	 systems analysis, in particular  
systems ecology
•	 hydrology, in particular hydro-
biology of rivers and lakes.
The following five sectors of an economy were men-
tioned as possible focuses of pertinent research: 
transportation, energy economics, agriculture and 
forestry, soil conservation, landscape planning and 
development.
2.3 In the economics of long-term environmental 
development the central problem is, as always, the 
costs it entails. By now, many developments will be 
taken up by commercial firms, which, after substanti-
al investments in research and development (possib-
ly subsidized), expect profitable production oppor-
tunities – particularly so at present when long-term 
real interest rates are low, making investments more 
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feasible. Innovating firms in one of many hundreds 
of new fields can expect to become monopolists, in 
some cases even world monopolists. They might 
earn monopoly profits, though better not too conspi-
cuously, in order not to stimulate too many would-be 
competitors. Other developments, especially in the 
field of basic sciences – developments preparatory to 
production technologies –, will come to fruition only 
if they are substantially publicly subsidized. They de-
pend crucially on which fields, if any, public policy 
intends to stimulate most. Such stimulation might 
be important as development policy for certain new 
industries.
But, of course, stimulation of public research might 
also turn out an eventually vain endeavour. There 
is the famous example of Czech public research en-
deavours under Communism, which then cost four 
times more than comparable programs in Austria, 
but brought about at most half of Austria's effecti-
ve output, mainly because personnel politics were 
mixed up with the research. Furthermore, the history 
of innovation in steel production is a warning examp-
le even in a democracy: When Austrian public policy 
finally came around to backing a certain presumably 
profitable steel making process the more rapid in-
novators in other countries had already creamed off 
all the possible profits; and in addition, the still too 
hasty development of a new type of steel meant that 
the huge ensuing environmental problems had been 
most dangerously ignored.
A further cost aspect has already been touched upon. 
Lord Stern in his plea for an environmental policy 
to retard global warming had calculated that the 
respective measures would cost only 1% of GDP a 
year. But he typically assumed that the entire econo-
my would act as one actor, i.e. all those responsible 
would plan in the same direction. Such uniform be-
haviour is, however, rather unusual in a democracy. 
On the contrary, there are likely to be delays, inactivi-
ty and counter-effects in various branches. Therefore 
the total cost of any environmental policy is likely to 
be considerable higher.
In fact, the Association of Austria Industrialists has 
recently announced a strategy of preserving old and 
outmoded industries, a typical short-term stop-gap 
policy that tends to seem attractive in periods of 
doubtful and probably low demand. Immediately af-
ter the crash of 2008, German industry, followed by 
Austria, in fact installed a counter-productive policy: 
In order to stimulate traditional automobile produc-
tion, which for environmental reasons should have 
been reduced and possible even phased out, it was 
decided to scrap certain old, environment-damaging 
models of cars. Most of them were not scrapped at 
all, however, but sold to less developed countries, es-
pecially in Eastern Europe, so that the effect they had 
on world environmental damage was hardly reduced, 
while the "new" (traditional = gasoline using) cars ac-
tually increased environmental cost.
2.4 Let us discuss the economics of long-term en-
vironmental development in the five sectors menti-
oned in 2.2.
First to consider are future changes in transportation. 
They will be cost-determined. Mineral oil is running 
out and shale gas and other forms of gasoline cannot 
as yet be directly used in automobiles. Innovatory 
changes will make gas better usable in the future. But 
by 2050 energy to be used in road traffic may easily 
be three to four times as expensive as now: Public 
transport will once more have to come to the fore, es-
pecially in urban areas – and the more, the larger the 
conglomeration. Private cars are likely to be used for 
weekend travel and/or in much increased car sharing 
for going to and from workplaces. A considerable 
part of gainful work, however, will probably become 
home-centered in the meantime.
Energy economics is becoming of vital importance. 
The development and use of sources of more and 
more renewable energy will mean that water power, 
already now very important in Austria, will be even 
more harnessed to energy production. Wind pow-
er will have to be developed much more intensively, 
perhaps with the help of public subsidies. The drop 
in elevation at the Eastern end of the Alps is well sui-
ted to be used for wind power production. The possi-
bilities of collecting solar energy in Austria have not 
been thoroughly studied as yet; there may be quite 
a potential there. Last, not least, the increasing per-
centage of woodland may also provide a source of 
renewable energy.
This brings us to agriculture and forestry. Forests as 
important sources of environmental-friendly build-
ing materials and possibly as sources of energy are 
becoming more and more attractive investment op-
portunities. More rapidly growing trees to be planted 
in plains are being searched for. But the millennia old 
forest cover of the mountainous areas of Austria is 
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likely to remain the most economical source of wood. 
Over the past decades, the average temperature in the 
alpine areas of Austria has risen more than average 
world temperature, i.e. by about 2°C instead of only 
0.8°C. That is to say, forests will grow to 200–300 me-
ters higher up than over the last centuries: additional 
forests will start to become usable in formerly unpro-
ductive mountain areas. Woodland is thus likely to 
increase without the opportunity cost of losing some 
other production. For this reason alone forests are 
likely to exceed 50% of the usable land area of Aus-
tria soon. 
Land resources for dairy farming are likely to stay 
more or less the same, while the productivity increa-
se in their use is likely to continue. With rising tem-
peratures worldwide and thus with longer periods 
of aridity, conditions of grain production, however, 
may markedly deteriorate. In particular, grain foods 
are going to become three to four times as expensi-
ve as now, and meat of grain-fed animals will do so 
as well. As is well known, the production of beef is 
highly inefficient as to land use and energy use. Fu-
ture generations will therefore have to turn more and 
more to consuming soy beans and other pulses. The 
demand for "organically grown" food also tends to 
increase food prices.
Soil conservation and landscape planning and deve-
lopment ask for long-term economic perspectives. 
Problems might arise here because of a short-term 
orientation of land use – in agriculture, in particular 
in industry, as well as in housing. The end product 
of short-term overuse of soil is likely to be waste-
land. In England, the "first industrial nation", as 
well as along the waste strip along the former "Iron 
Curtain" throughout Europe, un-thought of develop-
ments have occurred in wastelands: Because of the 
complete absence of fertilizers, some such areas have 
become a reservoir of rare plants, which had been 
destroyed in other, "cultivated" areas.
To a large extent soil conservation is an issue of long-
term property rights. Builders who wish to resell 
soon are typical "sinners" as to long-term soil conser-
vation, and many small communities are politically 
dominated by the interests of private builders. Land-
owning farmers, particularly in Austria, tend, how-
ever, to have a more long-term and thus preserving 
perspective. Happily we do not have the sometimes 
catastrophic "wild" build-ups of many less developed
economies – due to the absence of individual pro-
perty rights.
Very important is the energy consumption of the 
industrial sector. Close to 40% of all energy use is 
by industry and another close to 40% by road traf-
fic. With motorcars, the most important issue is that 
the rapidly rising cost increases of natural oil and gas 
be fully passed on to the oil and gas consumers. Of 
course, they will ask for subsidies, but such wishes 
will have to be ignored. This is the only way to bring 
down private use of motorcars. If cars that use much 
energy were additionally taxed, once more an already 
now plausible policy measure, no further policy initi-
ative would seem to be necessary.
But in the case of industry the total energy cost ra-
rely exceeds 5% of cost, and is frequently much less – 
with the important exception of steel and aluminium 
production. Here, the likely howls for subsidies in 
case of progressive cost increases would have to igno-
red: For its survival, industry depends on its know-
how and not on non-wage costs. Actually, in many 
cases that would not at all mean losing most of the 
firms, as planning and sales costs are much more im-
portant than mere material production. (After 1990, 
there were cases, in fact, where Austrian firms shifted 
production across the borders to Slovak or Hungari-
an locations, then "imported" the finished products 
to Austria and, before marketing them, just marked 
up the price by 100%, thus turning the product cost-
wise into a "local" = Austrian one.) 
Thus the proportion of energy consumption by in-
dustry will have to be very substantially reduced. Pl-
anning and sales efforts consume little energy; and 
industrial innovation is going to be mainly energy 
saving. When both transport and industry require 
mainly only renewable energy, the aim of not letting 
global temperature increase by more than some two 
degrees can be more or less achieved, as far as Aust-
rian  energy  use  is  concerned.  And  the  necessary 
innovatory types of industries are likely to use energy 
only sparingly.
The most important one of all vital resources is clean 
water – becoming more and more of a scarcity world-
wide. International conflicts as to water use are alrea-
dy simmering, e.g. in the Middle East. Mountainous 
Austria is particularly rich in water, but the legal si-
tuation (water law and individual water rights) is not 
unequivocally clear: a conflict between federal and 
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local government agencies is lurking. There are vari-
ous unanswered questions, e.g. as to rights of spring-
owners or the obligations of agents using running 
water for private energy production.
In all of the above sectors, preservation cannot be 
achieved by producing more of the same, but by cou-
rageously exploring possibly cost-effective avenues 
of change. 
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